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WHAT IS DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY? 
 
Discursive psychology (DP) is the application of discourse analytic principles to 
psychological topics.  In psychology’s dominant ‘cognitivist’ paradigm, individuals build 
mental representations of the world on the basis of innate mental structures and perceptual 
experience, and talk on that basis.  The categories and content of discourse are considered to 
be a reflection, refracted through various kinds of error and distortion, of how the world is 
perceived to be.  In contrast, DP begins with discourse (talk and text), both theoretically and 
empirically.  Discourse is approached, not as the outcome of mental states and cognitive 
processes, but as a domain of action in its own right. 
In DP it is the business of talk and text to define the nature of the world under 
description, including the mental states, perceptions, motivations, dispositions, thoughts, 
prejudices, and so on, of any persons involved, whether as actors in described events or as the 
producers and recipients of descriptions (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  Both ‘reality’ and ‘mind’ 
are constructed by people conceptually, in language, in the course of their performance of 
practical tasks (Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996a; Potter, et al., 1993).  Because of this emphasis, 
shared with ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, on the situated, action-
performative nature of talk, DP favours the analysis of records of natural interaction, or 
textual materials produced as part of life’s activities (newspaper reports, medical records, 
written testimony, etc.), rather than using experiments, surveys and interviews to generate 
research data. 
For theoretical, methodological and empirical reasons, DP takes discourse to be 
central to everyday life.  Most social activity involves or is directly conducted through 
discourse.  Furthermore, even where activity is ‘non-verbal’ (embodiment, physical actions 
and their settings, etc.), its sense is often best understood through participants’ discourse.  
Discourse is the prime currency of interaction, and if we are studying persons embedded in 
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practices, including institutional settings, then discourse will be central to that study.   Let us 
consider in turn three features of discourse that relate closely to how it has to be analysed: it 
is situated, action-oriented, and constructed. 
 
Discourse is situated 
 
DP focuses on discourse, which it regards as ‘situated’ in two ways.  First, it is occasioned in 
the conversation analytic sense of this term (see section 1 of this book).  That is, talk and 
texts are embedded in sequences of interaction, and in various kinds of mundane and 
institutional activity.  This is not a mechanical contextual determinism; talk is oriented to, but 
not determined by, its sequential position and setting.  Thus a ‘question’, say, sets up the 
normative relevance of an ‘answer’, but an answer is not inevitable or necessary, and things 
do not break down if it is not provided. Answers may be deferred or withheld altogether 
(Heritage, 1984).  Likewise, the fact that talk appears in a school or a doctor’s surgery does 
not mean that it must thereby be pedagogic or medical.  Rather than being made 
presumptively omni-relevant by the analyst, institutional activities and identities are made 
relevant by participants themselves, by being invoked and oriented to, or indeed subverted 
and ignored (Schegloff, 1997). 
Second, DP considers discourse to be pervasively rhetorical (Billig, 1987, 1991).  
Claims and descriptions offered in talk are often designed to counter potential alternative 
versions, and to resist attempts (whether actual or potential) to disqualify them as false, 
partial or interested (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  That is, they can have both a defensive and an 
offensive rhetoric (Potter, 1996a).  For example Billig (1991) argues that when people offer 
evaluations of something (an activity that social psychologists might call ‘expressing an 
attitude’), they are typically countering some other evaluation.  This means that evaluative 
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discourse is shaped not merely by how people generally think about things, but by the 
contingencies of argument and the alternatives in play at the time that an evaluation is 
produced (cf. Pomerantz, 1984). 
Analysis, therefore, takes into account the sequentially occasioned, situationally 
oriented, and rhetorically designed nature of discourse.  DP’s particular focus when 
approaching discourse in institutional settings is on how psychological matters are 
introduced, defined, and made relevant to the business of those settings.  Psychological 
themes are generally pervasive in how such settings work, as they are in mundane talk, but 
they are sometimes also part of an institution’s official normative goals or agenda, such as in 
educational and therapeutic settings, where how people think and feel are a central focus of 
concern. 
 
Discourse is action-oriented 
 
Discourse performs actions or practices of various kinds – agreements, blamings, invitations, 
displays of neutrality, and so on. ‘Action’ or ‘practice’ (the precise term is not meant to carry 
weight here) invokes the vast range of practical, technical and interpersonal tasks that people 
perform while doing their jobs, living their relationships, and participating in heterogeneous 
cultural domains.  It is central to people’s lives, and therefore central to understanding those 
lives.  Following the convention in conversation analysis, DP uses the notion of action-
orientation to emphasize that actions are pervasively being done even in ostensibly factual, 
descriptive discourse, and to distance itself from a ‘speech act’ approach that assumes that 
some discrete set of words correspond to a discrete act. 
The corollary of DP’s focus on discourse as action is its respecification of cognition.  
Instead of cognitive entities and processes being the principal analytic resource, as they are in 
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mainstream psychological research, they are approached empirically as participants’ ways of 
talking.  The focus is on the way cognitions are constructed in talk, and how their 
implications are oriented to.  Taking ‘attitudes’ again as an example, rather than treating these 
as inner entities that drive behaviour, in DP attitudes are evaluations that are studied as part 
of discourse practices (Potter, 1996b, 1998).  Such an approach might consider the way 
evaluations are organized interactionally, as in Pomerantz’s (1978) study of compliments; it 
might consider how attitudes are interactionally produced through social psychological 
methods (Myers, 1998; Puchta & Potter, forthcoming); or it might consider the way negative 
evaluations of minority group members are turned from potentially accountable personally 
held ‘attitudes’ or ‘prejudices’ into more ‘safely sayable’ factual descriptions (e.g. Edwards, 
2000a; Potter & Wetherell, 1988; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
This non-cognitivist reformulation of ‘attitudes’ avoids the circularity of many social 
psychological studies, where evaluative discourse (in response scales) is turned into 
underlying cognitive entities (attitudes), which are in turn used to explain actions (involving 
more discourse).  It avoids the uncomfortable blurring of everyday and technical notions in 
the attitude and belief domain, by taking peoples’ evaluative terminology (attitude, belief, 
opinion, position, view, etc.) as topic rather than as a competing but less adequate theory of 
behaviour (cf. Edwards, 1997, on psychology and common sense in general).  It makes sense 
of the troubling variability in people’s evaluative talk, which stems from the fact that people 
produce evaluations as parts of various discourse practices and their ‘occasions’, rather than 
expressing pre-formed, all-purpose mental entities when asked to do so by a researcher.  It 
focuses attention on life as a practical realm where evaluations are part of getting things done, 
rather than existing as disembedded assessments waiting to be produced in moments of 
reflection. 
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Discourse is constructed 
 
DP is constructionist in two senses.  First, it studies the way discourse itself is constructed.  
Words, metaphors, idioms, rhetorical devices, descriptions, accounts, stories, and so on, are 
drawn on, and built, in the course of interaction and in the performance of particular actions.  
For example, descriptions may be assembled in ways that present some piece of conduct as 
orderly and required by the circumstances, as just what anybody would have done, or else as 
unusual, specially motivated, and implicative of the actor’s particular psychology (Edwards, 
1994, 1997).  Second, it studies the way discourse constructs versions of the world.  That is, it 
studies how versions of inner life, of local circumstances, of history and broader social 
groups and structures are produced to do particular things in interaction.  In DP, then, 
discourse is both constructed and constructive. 
Although DP is a constructionist approach, its emphasis on the construction of 
versions in discourse distinguishes it from cognitive constructionisms ranging from Neisser 
(1967), to Moscovici (1984), to Berger and Luckmann (1966).  The essence of DP is to study 
construction – how versions are assembled and stabilized as factual and independent of their 
producer – as a discourse activity.  Whereas cognitive constructionism tends to guide the 
researcher away from considering people’s practices, DP’s emphasis on the construction of 
specific versions encourages the researcher to consider the practices that those versions are 
part of, and the particular work that they are performing. 
At the centre of DP there is an inversion that, initially, appears counterintuitive.  In 
traditional psychology there is reality on the one hand, that is the setting – the ‘stimulus 
conditions’ that enclose actors – and there is cognition on the other, conceived as something 
existing and quietly computing inside the actors.  Activity is treated as something secondary, 
the output of this system.  DP inverts this.  Activity is treated as primary, and reality and 
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cognition are secondary. That is, DP focuses on what people are doing, and how, in the 
course of their discourse practices, they produce versions of external reality and of 
psychological states.  It asks how people categorize and formulate the world, establishing 
certain particulars as relevant, characterizing its moral flavour, and it asks how people at the 
same time formulate a relevant ‘inner’ world of beliefs, values, emotions and dispositions, 
that make their actions accountable.  The notion that actions take place within a kind of play-
off between an outer reality and an inner world of thoughts and experiences, is one of a range 
of ways that people talk and account for themselves.  DP’s task is to study how people do 
that, and what they do with it, rather than to adopt or reject it as our own explanatory 
framework.  In ethnomethodological terms mind and reality, and their interplay, are DP’s 
topic rather than resource (cf. Wieder, 1988). 
 
DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH EXAMPLES 
 
Much of the research literature in discursive psychology has reworked standard psychological 
topics such as causal attribution (Antaki, 1994; Edwards & Potter, 1992, 1993); attitudes 
(Billig, 1987; Potter, 1996b, 1998; Potter & Wetherell, 1987); memory (Edwards et al., 1992; 
Edwards & Potter, 1992; Middleton & Edwards, 1990); classroom learning (Edwards, 1993; 
Edwards & Mercer, 1987);  prejudice (Edwards, 2000a; Gill, 1993; Speer & Potter, 
forthcoming; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), identity (Antaki, 1998; Edwards, 1998; Widdicombe 
& Wooffitt, 1995), script theory (Edwards, 1994, 1997), emotion (Edwards, 1997, 1999; Frith 
& Kitzinger, 1998; Harré & Parrott, 1996; Locke & Edwards, forthcoming), and violence and 
aggression (Auburn et al., 1999; Clarke et al., forthcoming;  McKinlay & Dunnett, 1998; 
Hepburn, 2000).  It has also introduced topics new to psychology, such as the relation 
between interaction, mental state attributions and social institutions (Edwards, 1995; te 
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Molder, 1999), and the construction and establishment of factual accounts (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; MacMillan & Edwards, 1999; Potter, 1996a; Wooffitt, 1992). 
Rather than attempt to review this and other related work, we offer two brief 
illustrations of these strands of DP.  We focus briefly on ‘prejudice’, and then examine how 
talk in a counselling setting, including how relationship problems are defined, orientates to 
various normative and interactional requirements of that setting. 
 
DP and Prejudice 
 
We have noted that people construct versions of the world that attend to their factual status, 
to the psychology of participants in reported events, and to the current interaction in which 
versions are offered.  These moves are often done simultaneously (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  
For example a mental state (belief, certainty, fear, doubt) may be produced as determined by 
the external world, which may itself be produced as known through repeated experiences 
(Edwards, 1994).  Another way of grounding factual claims is to offer them as reluctantly 
arrived at, or as counter to one’s presumptions and biases (Edwards, 2000a; Potter, 1996a).  
These (and other) ways of talking counter the possibility, which may be at stake in the current 
interaction, that you believe what it suits you to believe, or what you believed before you 
looked, that your beliefs are a function of mental predisposition rather than external reality — 
that is, they attend rhetorically to a possible dismissal as pre-judgement, or prejudice. 
Extract 1 is taken from an interview from the early 1980s (R is the interviewee; I is 
the interviewer) in New Zealand concerning a controversial South African rugby tour, prior 
to that country’s abandonment of apartheid (see Edwards, 2000a, for an extended discussion 
of this and other examples). 
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Extract 1  
1 R: Uhm (1.2) I would li:ke to see apartheid done away with 
2  (1.0) but can anybody come up with a- [a (.)    
3 I:         [Mm mhm 
4 R: positive way of saying “This is how it can be done” 
5 I: Mm mhm 
6 R: It’s all very well to turn round and say “Give ’em a vote” 
7 I: Yes 
8 R: I mean the majority of them (1.0) don’t know what a vote is 
9 I: Mm mhm 
 
R’s argument for apartheid occurs in the context (not reproduced here) of justifying 
his support of the controversial rugby tour.  He offers his position as one that is forced by 
practical realities.  The notion that the speaker might be talking out of some kind of 
preference or liking for apartheid – that is, because of psychological disposition (prejudice) 
rather than worldly reality – is further countered by locating his preferences as precisely the 
opposite.  He would like it done away with (line 1), if only that were realistically possible.  
This counter-dispositional construction is a feature of talk about sensitive and controversial 
issues, but it draws on a general device in factual discourse, which is making a version or 
conclusion factually robust by formulating it as reluctantly arrived at.  The same device is 
used in Extract 2. 
Extract 2 
1 I: (...) d’you think there should be res- (.) restrictions 
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2  on immigration?  
3  (.)   
4 I: How do you [feel about 
5    R:                      [Oh yes.= There’s got to be. 
6 I: Ye[:h 
7  R:     [Unfortunately, 
8 I: my[e:h 
9  R:      [I would love to see the whole wor:ld y’know,  
10  jus’ where you: (.) go where you like, 
  
R appeals to necessity in contrast to personal preference or desire, a disposition 
formulated as an emphatic, even extreme counter-preference (“would love”, “whole world”, 
line 9) for a world where people can “go where you like”.  Note the symmetrical appeal to 
both sides of the psychological equation, to an external known world (“there’s got to be”, line 
5) that constrains a reluctant belief or opinion (line 7 “unfortunately”, line 9 “would love”).  
R’s reluctance is not a free-standing indication of his attitude, but deals with the interviewer’s 
specific framing of the questions (both line 1 “do you think…” and line 4 “how do you 
feel…”), and to the possibly unwelcome inferences about him that would be available were 
he simply to support apartheid (cf. Antaki & Wetherell, 1999). 
It is important to emphasize that this kind of analysis entails no commitment to the 
genuineness or falsity of R’s reluctance, preferences, nor any other mental state that might be 
conceptualized, managed by, or at issue in the talk.  DP analyses it all as ways of talking that 
can be unravelled through a detailed analysis of how specific descriptions are constructed in 
ways that perform discursive actions within sequential, rhetorical sequences of talk. 
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DP and Institutional Settings: Couple counselling 
 
Cognitive social psychology attempts to generate social-cognitive explanations that link 
underlying variables to outcomes.  This effectively directs attention away from the specific 
structural organizations that make up any culture, such as factory production lines, doctors’ 
surgeries, family meal times, and so on.  In emphasizing the occasioned, action-oriented and 
constructed nature of discourse, DP is required to pay attention to such specifics.  In this 
emphasis on talk-at-work it picks up from the success of conversation analysis in 
productively explicating relations between discourse and social organization (Drew & 
Heritage, 1992). 
Extract 3 indicates some potentially intricate relations between lexical selection and 
the situated activities that are being done. It comes from early in a couple’s first relationship 
counselling session, and starts with the counsellor asking about their first separation (see also 
Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996a).  C is the counsellor, W the wife, and H the husband. 
Extract 3 
1 C: Was that the time that you left?= 
2 W: =He left the:n that was- [ nearl ]y two years ago. 
3 C:       [°Yeh.°] 
4 W: He walked out then.  
5  (.) 
6 W: Just (.) literally walked out. 
7  (0.8) 
8 C: ↑Oka↓y.  So, (0.5) for me list↓enin:g, (.) you’ve 
9      got (0.5) rich an:d, (.) complicated lives,  
 10
10  I nee:d to get some his[tory  to  put-  ] 
11 W:    [Yyeh. Mmm, ] 
12 H: [Mmm. (.)  Ye:h.  (.)  Oh ye:h. ] 
13 W: [Yeh. (.) That’s (.) exactly wha]t ih °um° 
   
Let us focus on the Counsellor’s formulation of what he takes W and H to have been 
saying about themselves, that they have “rich and complicated lives” (line 9).  A number of 
analysts have observed that formulations (providing gists and upshots of what people are 
saying – Heritage & Watson, 1980) play an important role in counselling talk (Davis, 1986; 
Buttny & Jensen, 1995).  Indeed they seem to index counselling talk in much the way that 
Initiation-Response-Evaluation sequences suggest classroom interaction (Mehan, 1979).  So, 
what might such formulations be doing in counselling talk?  Let us open up some lines of 
investigation to illustrate DP’s approach. 
First, “rich and complicated” converts a rather painful account of trouble and conflict 
into something positive, or at the very least interesting.  In this it may contrast with critical or 
anxious responses that the couple might have had from friends or relatives.  The counsellor 
presents himself via this formulation as neither judging nor made anxious by talk about 
difficult relationship problems.  Quite the reverse, “rich and complicated” looks forward to 
the exploration of these complexities. 
Second, it is an impartial formulation, neither criticizing nor supporting either party.  
This, of course, is an issue for relationship counselling where trust might easily be broken if 
the counsellor is seen as aligning with one party against the other.  In its particular sequential 
placing, following the wife’s criticisms of her husband, this turn neither disagrees nor agrees 
with the criticisms.  They are left on the table, as it were, for possible later discussion.  The 
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interactional outcome of this can be seen in the couple’s joint and emphasized agreement 
with the formulation (lines 11-13). 
Third, and less obviously perhaps, this avoidance of taking sides, and the treatment of 
the events as neither bad or worrying, can be part of a broader emphasis on how the couple 
can constructively work toward repairing their relationship.  One step will be to become more 
relaxed about discussing their problems and less fearful of its consequences.  Moreover,  
“complicated” is a descriptive term that sets up relationship problems as a kind of puzzle that 
can be unravelled via counselling.  That is, it provides for the counselling which is to come, 
as a sensible option where the technical skills will be put to enthusiastic work sorting out 
complications.  These latter orientations of the formulation “rich and complicated lives”, and 
of its specific location in the talk, are rather speculative on their own, and with regard to just 
this one extract, but could be part of a larger analysis of how participants’ psychological 
states, personalities, dispositions, pathologies, motivations, emotions, intentions, and so on, 
are formulated in ways that orient to the nature and business of counselling, as an activity 
setting. 
One interesting feature of our couple counselling materials is how people display 
themselves as, say, making efforts at understanding the other, or as hopelessly opposed.  
Conflicting perceptions, thoughts, feelings and evaluations, for example, are produced as 
conflicting, at loggerheads despite all efforts, and therefore ready for, and in need of, 
intervention.  Opposition and impasse are not merely psychological preconditions for 
counselling that couples find themselves in, but are actively produced in how they talk, 
particularly at the outset when telling the counsellor why they have come (this being routine 
first session business).  The conventional notion of couples who do not properly understand 
each other, or who suffer from an inability to communicate, although effective as an account 
for relationship failure, can be a poor description of couples whose conflicting stories may be 
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exquisitely designed to display conflict, and may be closely oriented to, and predictive of, 
each other’s alternative perspective. 
It is a feature of counselling at work that the couple undergoing counselling make 
themselves available for it (or sometimes resist it), in how they talk.  Their display of mutual 
opposition and impasse provides for the counsellor’s even-handed, neutral treatment of them, 
as a couple with “rich and complicated lives” for example, and as a kind of puzzle awaiting 
solution.  Extract 4a is close to the start of the same couple’s first session, coming a short 
time after extract 3. 
Extract 4a 
1 C: Whe:n:::, (.) before you moved ov↓er here, hhow was
2  the marriage. 
3  (0.4) 
4 W: ↑O↓h. 
5  (0.2) 
6 W: I- (.) to me: all alo:ng (.) right up to now, (0.2) my
7  marriage was rock solid. 
8  (0.8) 
9 W: Rock solid.=  We had arguments like everybody else 
10  had arguments, (0.4) buthh (0.2) to me there was no
11  major problems. Y'know? That's (0.2) my way of 
12  thinking but (0.4) Jimmy's thinking is very very different. 
  
The idea that W’s version of their marriage not only conflicts with H’s (examined 
below), but is produced as conflictual, making conflict hearable or visible as such, is 
supported by various details.  Note the use of extreme case formulations, in how W defines 
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her version of their marriage: “all along”, “right up to now”, “rock solid”, like “everybody” 
else (lines 6-9).  These extreme expressions maximize W’s position, and its distance from 
H’s.  Pomerantz (1986) has shown how extreme formulations of this kind tend to occur when 
claims are being strengthened against doubt or disagreement.  They can also be used to signal 
the speaker’s commitment and investment in those claims (Edwards, 2000b). 
Note also how W overtly acknowledges H’s opposition (lines 11-12), while attending 
rhetorically to what H may say; they have presumably argued about this already, of course, 
and H is sitting next to W ready to say his piece.  W designs her version with regard to H’s 
opposed version, yet to be produced, and in strong contrast to it.  Note small details such as 
the latching in line 9 – how W immediately attaches the disclaimer about their “arguments” 
to the description of extreme stability, “rock solid”.  This is rhetoric in action, orienting to 
H’s opposed version which, as we see in extract 4b, makes much of those “arguments” they 
have been having. 
H’s disagreement is not far away.  As W acknowledges (extract 4a, lines 11-12) this is 
her version, and H’s “thinking” is “very very different”.  H’s versions of their marriage focus 
on its extreme lack of solidity, as evidenced by the frequency and severity of their arguments, 
which H upgrades to fights (extract 4b, line 19), and (not included here) in how he had 
actually left W a couple of times. 
Extract 4b  (continuing from 4a) 
12 W: (…) but (0.4) Jimmy's thinking is ve[ry very different.] 
13 H:               [ Well   (1.0)        ] 
14  Bein: (0.8) a jealous person, (0.8) u:m, (0.6) we go back- 
15   (.) back to: (0.6) when we were datin' (1.0) when we 
16  were dating first (0.8) well we met in this: particular pub. 
17  (1.0) 
 14
18 H: >When we start'd datin' we was in there,< 
19  <EV'ry single week> we'd fight. 
20  (0.2) 
21 H: We were at each other the who:le time. 
 
Again H’s account does not just find itself in contrast to W’s, but is designed in ways 
that point up and maximize that opposition.  What W called “arguments” have become “we’d 
fight” (line 19), so it was both severe (fights rather than arguments) and recurrent, again 
deploying extreme case formulations in “every single week” (line 19) and “the whole time” 
(line 21).  Like W’s picture of a rock solid marriage, H’s picture of perpetual and severe 
conflict stems right from the start of their relationship, from when they first started dating 
(lines 15-18).  The extreme case formulations are important because they index both W and H 
going to extremes discursively, in depicting not just the nature of their relationship, but the 
extent of their disagreement about it (Edwards, 2000b). 
H’s preface “being a jealous person…” (line 14) looks a bit strange where it is placed, 
but it refers to something W had said a couple of minutes previously (not included here, but 
see Edwards, 1997) when she identified a major problem of their marriage as H’s excessive 
and long-term disposition to fits of jealousy.  Its placement here, at line 14, displays H’s 
uptake of W’s account in extract 4a as relevant to that accusation – that theirs was an 
essentially solid marriage suffering from H’s being an unreasonably “jealous person” – and 
provides it as a preface to his own account of a marriage characterized from the start by 
mutual and pervasive antagonism.  The thing of special interest for DP is how mental and 
emotional and dispositional state descriptions such as ‘jealous’ or ‘jealous person’ figure not 
merely as actual psychological states, nor even as participants’ all-purpose cognitive 
understandings of their psychological states, but as parts of situated descriptions, to be 
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analysed for their production at a specific point in the talk, as oriented to a particular 
rhetorical alternative alive in that talk, and to the counselling setting in which it occurs. 
We can begin to see that these are not merely different and inconsistent accounts 
produced by W and H, the stuff of communication failures and misunderstandings, for 
instance.  They are contrasting accounts constructed precisely in opposition to an actual 
alternative, in that they display an orientation to that alternative and its evidential and 
rhetorical grounds.  They are constructed in extreme terms, maximizing differences and 
opposition.  We take this not merely as an indication of how opposed this couple is, but as a 
performance of some kind, a display for the counsellor and for counselling, of two persons at 
an impasse and in need of help. This kind of talk sets their problems up as counselling-
appropriate and counselling-ready.  It shows, in answer to the counsellor’s inquiry, why they 
have come. 
To summarize, W’s and H’s opposed versions display the following features: 
(1) extremity, displaying strong commitment to a position and maximizing opposition; 
(2) acknowledgement, a clear orientation to the other person’s opposed version; 
(3) symmetry, in which the opposition is direct, counterpointed, detailed; 
(4) reformulation, where specific alternative descriptions are offered. 
Extract 5 comes from a different couple and counsellor, again close to the start of 
their first session.  W is the first to respond to C’s request to tell “why you went to Relate in 
the first place”, and extract 5 is how she ends her account. 
Extract 5 
1 W: And then: (.) u:m: (2.8) 'n that's when I decided to: (.)  
2  uhh w- we tried to sort it out ourselves didn't we, (0.6) 
3  a:nd (0.7) we seemed to be going round in cir:cles.   
4  H-he: had his thoughts I had my thoughts (0.6) and 
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5  we just didn't come to an agreement on anything. 
6  (.) 
7 W: And that's when we decided we ought to come (.) 
8  to Relate. 
 
In extract 5 W explicitly formulates a kind of stand-off or impasse as their reason for 
seeking counselling (‘Relate’ is the counselling organization).  Having tried to solve their 
own problems (line 2), W and H have hit an impasse, and these is are offered as explanatory 
precursors for now seeking help.  As in extracts 4a and 4b, W’s description of relationship 
troubles, whatever its basis in fact, is shaped as a motivational account for being here, as an 
account of troubles that is oriented to normative preconditions for counselling – they are 
opposed, stuck, having tried and failed to help themselves.  The expression “going round in 
circles” (line 3), defines their problems as relationship troubles of an idiomatically familiar 
kind, recurrent and unresolved.  It captures the sense of impasse that, in extracts 4a and 4b, 
was produced by extreme and opposed versions.  Note also the precise symmetry of “he had 
his thoughts I had my thoughts” (line 4), repeating the same verbal formula while at the same 
time defining their troubles as psychological, opposed ways of thinking.  Again, there is the 
use of extremity (“on anything”, line 6), emphasizing the size of the gulf between them.  
Finally, there is the performative relevance or upshot of these descriptions, their availability 
as an answer to C’s inquiry – their reason for being here (lines 7-8). 
In addition to making explicit descriptions of their relationship, the couple in extract 5 
display their opposition in the way they describe and narrate events in their lives, using 
extreme case formulations, symmetrically opposed versions and reformulations of what each 
other says.  In doing so, they display an acute orientation to what the other has said or is 
likely to say, and an orientation to the requirements of counselling and the prospects of 
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receiving help.  There is no space to go into that detailed choreography of versions properly 
here, but extract 6 illustrates how the counsellor picks up features of clients’ versions and 
formulates them as (in this case) directly opposed, systemic, and symmetrical.  At the same 
time, their problems are defined as relationship stuff, rather than a matter of individual 
persons and their faulty characters, and as problems of a recognizable kind, and thus 
potentially tractable to counselling. 
Extract 6 
1 C: I’m say:in::g you come here:, (0.2) becau:se (.) >y’r 
2  marriage is in a ↑mess:.< 
3  (0.5) 
4 C:      It was: (0.4) what you ((referring to W)) would (.) 
5  descri:be as rock ↑sol↓id. Then all of a sudden,  
6   you’ve ((referring to H)) gone off, (0.2) the thing  
7  you fear:, (1.2) of: (.) Connie, (.) you actually wen’  
8  off (.) and did, (0.2) be[cause of the pain-   ] 
9 W:     [That’s another thing] (.) I  
10  used to say to myself (.) y’know, (.) ↑my husband  
11  would never have an affair because he is so: (0.2)  
12  strict and such HI:gh MOrals an’ everything else  
13  about what ↑I would do:, (0.3) he has gone o:ff and  
14  done eXACtly, (0.4) y’know, (.) 
15  C: But what’s happened is there’s a kind of vicious  
16   circle that’s going around. 
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Note various features of the counsellor’s interventions here.  The expression “because 
your marriage is in a mess” (lines 1-2) is reminiscent of the other counsellor’s “rich and 
complicated lives” in extract 3.  In the same way, it dissolves the two conflicting versions 
into a description of relationship, and avoids alignment with either party’s opposed and 
extreme position.  The counsellor picks up and formulates their troubles as symmetrical; H 
has, ironically, gone and done just what he feared W might do (lines 5-8).  W takes this as an 
opportunity for extrematized criticism of H; note again her use of the extreme terms “never”, 
“everything else”, “exactly” (lines 11-14).  The counsellor once again resists being recruited 
into alignment with W against H, formulating their troubles as something that has 
“happened” (line 15, a nicely non-agentive process rather than action verb), and glossing it as 
“a kind of vicious circle that’s going round” (lines 15-16; note that this is not the same 
counsellor and couple as in extract 5, where W also uses the expression “going round in 
circles”). 
The counsellor’s formulation of the clients’ troubles as symmetrical, circular and 
systemic (relationship stuff rather than individuals) sets up those troubles as recognizable-to-
counselling.  She spells that out in extract 7, in the form of an emblematic pattern of 
symmetrically opposed perspectives. 
Extract 7 
1 C: it's it's what I call the Jack and Ji:ll situation, that (.) 
2  Jack will say I go to the pu:b (.) because Jill nags. 
3  (0.6) 
4 C: Jill will say: no:, (1.8) I only na:g because he goes 
5  to the pu:b. 
6  (0.5) 
7 C: And he'll say no: I go to the pub because you nag
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8  (0.2) so it's this sort of (.) up and d[ow:n situation, 
9 W:             [oMm (.) that's 
10  (the way it is isn't ito) 
 
Extract 7 formulates a kind of generalized script or schema (see also Edwards, 1995) 
into which H’s and W’s pattern of conflict can be fitted, one that is potentially applicable to 
any number of actual relationship problems, and recognizable as such to C (line 1 “it’s what I 
call the…”).  Clearly the example of going to the pub and nagging is just that – an example, 
for a wide range of possible actual disputes.  The character names “Jack and Jill”, from the 
nursery rhyme, help identify them as generalized rather than actual persons.  Note also the 
orientation to opposed versions produced in talk; it is a pattern in which Jack and Jill say that 
the other nags or goes out – not that they actually do it (lines 2, 4, 7).  It is a matter of ways of 
seeing and understanding, a ways of seeing or patterns of talking kind of conflict, rather than 
the facts of the matter (how much they actually go out or nag).  This sets it up for the talking 
cure, for working things through in counselling. 
Again, as with the term “happened” in extract 6, troubles are formulated as a non-
agentive “situation” (lines 1, 8) that couples may find themselves in.  ‘Situation’ descriptions 
typically provide for less blaming kinds of actions by actors (Edwards & Potter, 1993).  
Systemic reciprocity is again built into the relationship, via a precise symmetry; the nagging 
causes the going out, and the going out causes the nagging.  So the reciprocating 
recriminations of relationship troubles talk are transformed into a recognizable-as-standard, 
and potentially tractable-by-counselling, “situation”. 
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DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS 
 
In Wieder’s (1974) ethnomethodological terms, the descriptions and formulations we have 
looked at here are multiformulative and multiconsequential, just as they are in any kind of 
discourse.  They formulate the world and the identities of the participants in a range of 
different ways, and they have a range of practical upshots.  Our general point has been to 
show the value of treating discourse as occasioned (in this sequence, in counselling talk), as 
action-oriented (addressing a range of practical counselling tasks), and as both constructed 
(from particular terms and devices) and constructing (of the clients’ problems in ways that 
prepares them for counselling work). 
Discursive psychology’s interest in institutional settings is in how the psychological is 
worked up and recruited for various kinds of institutional business and orientations.  
Sometimes, as in schools and counselling settings, there is an obvious, official concern with 
matters of ‘mind’, with what people feel, think, know and understand.  But psychological 
matters are pervasive in all kinds of discourse and social interaction, given the general 
relevance of intentions, motives, thoughts, plans, memories, and so on, to life’s 
accountability.  We find psychological themes across a very broad range of studies of situated 
talk, even when those studies are concerned with ostensibly sociological rather than 
psychological problematics.  Examples include Pollner’s (1987) classic study of how ‘reality 
disjunctures’ are resolved in traffic courts; Wieder’s (1974) treatment of motives and 
understandings in accounts of rule-following in a half-way house; and Lynch and Bogen’s 
(1996) studies of the uses of ‘memory’ in the Iran-Contra hearings (cf. Edwards & Potter, 
1992b).  The ways that discourse categorizes and attributes mental states, competencies, 
dispositions, character, emotions, motives, and so on, are part of the fabric of public 
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accountability.  It is the project of discursive psychology to study how that works, alongside 
related studies of talk in mundane and institutional settings. 
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